Essential elements lacking in security proofs for quantum key distribution

Horace P. Yuen

doi:10.1117/12.2032082

29 October 2013 Essential elements lacking in security proofs for quantum key distribution

Horace P. Yuen

Proceedings Volume 8899, Emerging Technologies in Security and Defence; and Quantum Security II; and Unmanned Sensor Systems X; 88990J (2013) https://doi.org/10.1117/12.2032082
Event: SPIE Security + Defence, 2013, Dresden, Germany

Abstract

All the currently available unconditional security proofs on quantum key distribution, in particular for the BB84 protocol and its variants including continuous-variable ones, are invalid or incomplete at many points. In this paper we discuss some of the main known problems, particularly those on operational security guarantee and error correction. Most basic are the points that there is no security parameter in such protocols and it is not the case the generated key is perfect with probability ≥ 1 - ϵ under the trace distance criterion d ≤ ϵ, which is widely claimed in the technical and popular literature. The many serious security consequences of this error about the QKD generated key would be explained, including practical ramification on achievable security levels. It will be shown how the error correction problem alone may already defy rigorous quantitative analysis. Various other problems would be touched upon. It is pointed out that rigorous security guarantee of much more efficient quantum cryptosystems may be obtained by abandoning the disturbance-information tradeoff principle and utilizing instead the known KCQ (keyed communication in quantum noise) principle in conjunction with a new DBM (decoy bits method) principle that will be detailed elsewhere.

Citation Download Citation

Horace P. Yuen "Essential elements lacking in security proofs for quantum key distribution", Proc. SPIE 8899, Emerging Technologies in Security and Defence; and Quantum Security II; and Unmanned Sensor Systems X, 88990J (29 October 2013); https://doi.org/10.1117/12.2032082

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